

UDC 33

DOI: 10.34670/AR.2019.89.3.059

## Nature of land rent

**Nelli V. Tskhadadze**

Doctor of Economics, Professor,  
Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation,  
125993, 49, Leningradskii av., Moscow, Russian Federation;  
e-mail: nelly-vic@mail.ru

**Aza D. Ioseliani**

Doctor of Philosophy, Professor,  
Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation,  
125993, 49, Leningradskii av., Moscow, Russian Federation;  
e-mail: aza-i@yandex.ru

### Abstract

Currently, there is a need for a comprehensive and in-depth consideration of land-rent relations and the nature of land rent with a clear delimitation of its limits. Today, the concept of economic rent dominates in a broad sense, and insufficient attention is paid to land rent itself. The emergence of the phenomenon of rent beyond the boundaries of agriculture and the extractive industry contributed to the erosion of the concept itself and the depersonalization of land rent as an economic category. The authors give a comprehensive analysis of land-rent relations from the classics to the present. Land rent interacts and has a powerful influence on value relations, on the exchange proportions of goods of all groups, on the movement and usage of productive resources, on education and income distribution, and on the efficiency of social production in general. At the same time, land and rental relations themselves are also strongly influenced by these factors. Land rent plays a crucial role in these interrelated and interdependent relationships. Land rent plays a key role in the relations in economic systems, where the potential of land and natural resources is high. Therefore, land and rental relations, ownership of land and its products, education, distribution, production and social use of land rent should always be under the scrutiny of the state economic policy.

### For citation

Tskhadadze N.V., Ioseliani A.D. (2019) Nature of land rent. *Ekonomika: vchera, segodnya, zavtra* [Economics: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow], 9 (3A), pp. 536-545. DOI: 10.34670/AR.2019.89.3.059

### Keywords

Agriculture, land rent, land product, competition, land ownership, agrarian market, land-rent relations, rent payments.

---

## Introduction

The theory of land rent was developed by the representatives of the classical school in the period of formation and development of capitalism. Adam Smith does not have a harmonious theory of land rent, although he devoted a very extensive chapter to it in his main work. But his views on land rent can be described by the phrase that it is "...the work of nature which remains after deducting or compensating everything which can be regarded as the work of man" [Smith, 2007, 138].

J. Mill, K. Marx, K. Menger, J.H. von Thünen made a great contribution to the development of the theory of land rent. However, in this respect, works of D. Ricardo and A. Marshall stand out, as they gave fundamental provisions of the theory of land rent and land and rental relations [Marshall, 2013; Ricardo, 2004].

The economic theory, where the concept of economic rent in its broad sense currently dominates, pays insufficient attention to land rent itself. The emergence of the phenomenon of rent beyond the boundaries of agriculture and the extractive industry contributed to the erosion of the concept itself and depersonalization of land rent as an economic category.

Therefore, there is a need for a comprehensive and in-depth consideration of the nature of land rent with a clear distinction of its limits. It is necessary to reconsider the very approach to the study of land rent and economic relations associated with it, to overstep the barrier of its understanding solely as monetary income, to pay attention to the fact that land rent is, first of all, a tangible product or a product taken from a natural storeroom, or grown on fertile land.

Primary land rent is a life-supporting product, an irreplaceable and especially valuable product, the initial element of the reproduction process. A look at land rent from this standpoint can be the basis for rethinking its economic nature, organizing the system and developing a mechanism for the effective functioning of land and rental relations in a country's economy.

The basis for understanding the nature of land rent is not to limit it to the point of view of the economic realization of land ownership, but to see in the formation of rent a manifestation of the creative ability of the land, creating a product by invested labour (and often without it) with relatively less content of the share of labour having its own characteristics of market circulation than in other industries.

Land rent has two levels of being: initial, so called in kind and money market level.

The product of land obtained in agriculture does not always find a corresponding market value in terms of money due to the nature of the demand for it and market and structural characteristics of circulation. It violates the exchange in regards to labour equivalent and prevents the formation of rent in monetary terms. Outwardly, it is reflected in the fact that in market conditions, monetary rent formation in the agricultural sector is very unstable and constantly undergoing fluctuations.

Since rent-based land product is its primary factor in any industry, fluctuations in rent formation in various industries are reflected in value ratios in the economic system: they can change them so that exchange proportions become too heavy; first of all, for agriculture, where, from the beginning of market reforms, production began to decline. This is reflected in the efficiency of social production as a whole and it leads to its decline.

According to D. Ricardo, high rental payments are not the cause of high prices, but their result. Prices for products that may increase for various reasons, are of primary importance but the main one is the increase in population, and hence the demand for food.

On the one hand, D. Ricardo's land rent is the share of the land product paid for using the original and non-destructible forces of the soil. On the other hand, rent is not the result of the abundant fertility

of the land, but a consequence of its scarcity, which is expressed in the lack of highly fertile land and the need to cultivate plots of poor fertility [ibid., 308].

Addressing land rent, A. Marshall pursues the same basic purpose as the representatives of the classical school - which part of the earnings should be considered as the rent itself and how it should be taxed.

A. Marschall noted: "Lack of land in the absence of uneven fertility gives rise to the emergence of rent" [Marshall, 2013]. In principle, there is nothing new in this comment and anyone dealing with the problem of land rent proceeds from it. But another remark of A. Marschall, "from the point of view of an individual producer, land is only a special form of capital" [ibid.], is quite representative and is not in line with his own point of view.

When a person owns a farm, there is less land that other people can own. The area of agricultural land is quantitatively constant for a given society, capital (means of production) is variable in the long run. Although D. Ricardo noted that the cost of land in a densely populated area is many times higher than the cost of improving it, but A. Marshall uses this phenomenon in a different way and introduces the concept of social value of land. It allows A. Marshall to carry out the mentioned division of the annual value of land into three parts.

The first part stems from both natural qualities of soil and geographical and climatic location. This "annual initial and inalienable" cost must be paid in the form of tax (in favor of the society) by an owner, or by a tenant [ibid.]. The part of this value may be the result of people's activities, although not the activities of the owner or the tenant. It may appear due to the intensive settlement of the area, the formation of nearby industrially developed agglomeration. In this case, the value of land increases, despite the fact that the owner did not make improvements and did not invest capital. A. Marshall called this increase in the value of land due to intensive human activity the social value and considered it a relevant part of the land rent. According to A. Marshall, it generates the social value of land (public value), raising its price as a whole, occasionally many times over. The sum of the initial cost and the value generated from the activities of people, not the owner and the tenant, but activities that are social in nature, represents the annual social value of land or "real rent" [ibid.]. The part of the growth of the (annual) value of land, i.e. rent comes from the "labour and other costs of individual landowners"; according to A. Marshall, this is the "private value" of land. It does not refer to rent, it is the share of labour and capital of the owner of the land or its tenant. Taxation of the first part (social value) does not discourage land users from cultivating it. It does not affect (or, perhaps, it has little effect) on the supply of agricultural products, and therefore, on its price.

Regarding the "private value", A. Marshall proceeds from the fact that in the course of production use of land, the choice is made as to how to use it. If the landowner (tenant) sees that high profits received from new methods of cultivating land are taxed, he can refrain from these new methods of cultivating. Genuine taxed rent, the basis of which is natural properties of land, is "averaged out" for users of land and independent of the specific user. The landowner bears the tax burden on this part of the value of land, and it is not passed on to the consumer of the land product.

A. Marshall introduces the concept of quasi-rent which is a temporary surplus of income over the costs of the current use of the resource [ibid.]. This is an income, the change of which does not affect the supply of a given resource (good) today, but may affect it in the future. Therefore, it may disappear over time.

What can be accepted from A. Marshall unconditionally? This is the concept of public (annual) value and private value of land. The idea is fruitful and valuable in all aspects of land and rental relations. Also, this is the concept of quasi-rents, which explains a lot in land and rental relations, which

---

other concepts are not able to do. Regarding the practical significance of the theory of land rent, A. Marshall's comment on D. Ricardo's theory of taxes is of great importance: "... in the country ... it is very easy to adjust taxes on tillage and create such obstacles to its improvement, which temporarily enriches landowners and brings the rest of the population to poverty" [ibid.].

Further, we will follow and analyze the obstacles that arise and are created and make the cultivation of land meaningless for a producer working for the market; we will see whom they enrich and whom they rob. Most likely, these are not only and not so much about taxes, as many different absurdities of the value system of a market economy, which enrich some people much more than taxes do and also lead to the poverty of others.

But there are a number of provisions in the rental theory of A. Marshall that must be applied with caution with reference to land rent. First of all, this is universality that A. Marshall gave to the category of rent, starting with the remark that "... even land rent is by no means an isolated category, but a leading species of a large kind" [ibid.]. Subsequently, the concept of "economic rent" was introduced, which now often replaces the category of land rent. Thus, the latter became leveled, impersonal, and very often its essence and economic nature are interpreted in an incorrectly and one-sided way. The next moment is the identification of land with capital. Although A. Marshall's identification is implicit, it is a question of approach from the standpoint of a private producer, but, nevertheless, the precedent turned out to be very attractive. Land is not always considered as the most important production resource, and land rent, if it is mentioned, is spoken of very briefly. The modern leading school of economic theory (neoclassical economics) in the interpretation of the functions of production factors, including land, is based on maximizing benefits that are derived from the use of resources and their operational transferability from industry to industry. In a market economy, costs are based on the values that the market detects. If production resources generate less income than the income offered by the best possible alternative ways of using them, then we can assume that this way of using resources does not cover costs; then resources are transferred to another industry.

Neoclassicists study the use of land with the best possible advantage so that this use gives the greatest profit. The very interpretation of rent is limited for them by income, cash receipts for the use or payments of the user to the owner of the land. The analysis of this economic school assumes full mobility of land in an economic sense: land passes from hand to hand, from the production of one product to the production of another one, from one industry to another one. In this sense, the approach of A. Smith is quite distinctive: He proposes to consider land as a variable factor, referring to the fact that for a farmer, land often turned out to be a more variable factor than the supply of labour [Smith, 2007]. An example is given that a farmer who starts cultivating land, focuses on the number family members who are available for work, that is, he proceeds from the amount of land, but from the amount of labour.

Another characteristic of the approach, which is associated with the previous ones, implies freedom and competition for the use of land. As a result, it becomes clear what is required of the land user to keep it for himself, how much to pay, who will get these payments and how they pay off. The source of rent, the product of the land, remains ignored by the authors. Thus, the approach is limited to considering the results of work of market forces, that is, the size of the rent which some people pay and others receive. Without any doubt, the influence of D. Ricardo is obvious here [Ricardo, 2004]. The interpretation of rent comes from the prevalence of market forces that shape the price of the land product, which is reflected in rental payments for a user and in income for an owner of the land. However, in general, this approach does not seem as Ricardian. Rent as a whole, not land rent is considered specifically.

Classics of economic theory noted the difficulties in determining the amount of rent. A. Smith offers the following options for determining rent [Smith, 2007]: 1) payments by an entrepreneur for certain factors of production; 2) part of business payments paid to certain factors of production; 3) income received by owners of production resources; 4) part of the income received by the owners of certain production resources.

All variants of his definition of rent bear the stamp of a modernized approach to this concept. Significantly, the four options for rendering treat land rent as either company payments or owner income. Why is it impossible to determine the rent clearly, and why is it possible for the land? It is impossible because A. Smith implicitly means a certain general economic concept by this term relating to all factors of production, and not just a specific factor, that is the land with its fertility. In our opinion, without denying the importance of studying payments and income and market movement of land, its resources in conditions of free competition, it is preferable to choose a different starting point, another direction for research. This new direction is not the sum of money received from the use of the land, but the product that land gives, that is, the beginning of understanding brought by A. Smith. The basis of the life of society is an annual product of land plus what is created by labour of people of this society. This provision can not be cancelled or can not even be shaken by someone.

The product of land is the material basis of land and rental relations, taking into account conditions of use and production use.

It is obvious that the main conditions determining the formation and use of land rent are: 1) the emergence of an effectively working owner of land; 2) adequate exchange proportions, providing equivalent exchange and inter-branch overflow of land rent.

Moreover, exchange proportions are primary, and an effective owner appears only when they are acceptable for a given economic system.

Reforms began in the reverse order in the Russian agricultural sector. In the romantic period of the beginning of reforms in the late 1980s – early 1990s, a movement, that could be called “For Farming”, emerged in certain circles. Its' initiators hoped to solve the agrarian problem by introducing farming, followed by a complete transition of the agrarian sector to this type of management. The results of this movement are known: farming in Russia has not become widely popular. Given the exchangeable proportions that emerged after the liberalization of prices in 1992, such a failure was predetermined.

But this is not the only reason. There is a number of other reasons originating in the peculiarities of the functioning of agricultural farms in the conditions of the modern market, which determine their position in the system of competitive and value relations.

### **Modern land and rental relations**

Modern agricultural farms work in different conditions than the similar economy of the XIX – first half of the XX centuries. They tend to produce a small amount of products for their own consumption. These farms, which operate mainly for the market with all the ensuing consequences, function in conditions of the business society and the money economy. It is extremely difficult for a small farm and a small peasant household to stay afloat, to work at least without losses.

The number of farmers is steadily declining even in developed market countries, for example, in the US and EU countries. This is despite the fact that extremely favorable conditions have been created there for the work of agrarian farms, partly by nature, and for the most part by the state [Log, 1991].

The reduction of the number of farmers means that their place is occupied by larger farms. A farmer as such, a “family farmer” with a relatively small farm is being forced out of the business world, and

small farms, whose owners receive a large share of income in other spheres, become "hobby farms". Now, if we consider, for instance, the agricultural sector of the United States, we are essentially talking not about millions of farms, but about 180 thousand large enterprises that produce 75% of the industry's marketable products. Large agricultural farms receive most of the state aid. The share of 60% of small farms accounts for only 5% of the total amount of subsidies. This is due to the fact that subsidies issued to large farms are used with greater efficiency than those given to small farms.

But it is difficult to work profitably in the market conditions even for large agricultural holdings. The experience of the US agrarian sector proves this idea. The U.S. Government spent 428 billion dollars on support of producers of sixteen main types of agricultural products in 1980-1996.

Agrarian farms, which produce mainly food commodities, have practically no opportunity to raise prices, because the production of many thousands of farms, not to mention the products of foreign producers, is traded on the national market. The market for raw materials of agricultural enterprises of the country is extremely small-element on the supply side.

The society is faced with the fact that food commodities, being life-supporting products, do not receive the conditions necessary for normal reproduction in a free market. This can be considered a sign of products that modern economic theory refers to the group of "public goods", for which there is no private market demand. There is a private market demand for the products of the agrarian industry, but it is not sufficient for the normal reproduction process due to the scarcity of monetary expression. Monetary valuation of the market does not reflect the fact that a full-fledged product with an excess, that is rent, is received from the land and consumed. The agricultural sector, the producer of raw materials, gets only a small part of the total aggregate added value of food ready for consumption [Tskhadadze, 2018].

Accordingly, it is impossible to restrict ourselves to the concept of "regulation" with respect both to the agrarian sector as a whole, and the market for its products. Government purchases of agricultural products which are unsystematic and organized from time to time for acute need, or, conversely, commodity interventions do not solve anything. It is necessary to create a market for this product, where conditions for the equivalent exchange, competitive relations, and the normal reproduction process would be created for its producer.

To do this, it is advisable to use all the mechanisms and factors for creating and regulating the market of agricultural products and supporting agricultural holdings. These mechanisms are: the establishment of guaranteed prices; government purchases for the purpose of raising the prices for grain, vegetables, meat, milk and other products; regulation of the use of acreage; reimbursement of the difference between market and target prices to farms; direct subsidies for the restoration and increase of fixed capital; export subsidies; restriction of imports of agricultural products and others. In general, everything must be done to ensure that the ratio of price on products of agricultural farms, products of industry and energy provides an equivalent exchange. Only in this case, the agrarian sector, already working in an extreme situation by the initial natural and geographical conditions of reproduction, can find owners who are interested and efficient and who are capable of ensuring the normal functioning of the industry [Tskhadadze, 2017].

There was an opinion that was, probably, dominant at a certain period: the state of the agricultural sector of production depends on the ownership of land, on the dominant form of its ownership. It is impossible to underestimate the role of ownership in agriculture because land can be bought up and become a subject of speculation, what is unacceptable. There is also a threat of the formation of latifundia, which can become an obstacle in agricultural production, because a large landowner does not cultivate land, but leases it. It can simply become an extra parasitic link between society and a

producer. Therefore, the rational organization of land ownership is very important [Tskhadadze, 2016].

Forms and powers of land ownership play an important role in land and rental relations. Unlike the general economic conditions of market structures, consumer assessment of the product and other market-based natural factors, property is an institutional sphere. The state can provide the owner of the land with full authority, and can introduce almost any restrictions that it considers useful for production and for the welfare of society as a whole [Tskhadadze, 2017].

In the neoclassical economy, they proceed from the fact that, the land as a factor of production, possessing limitations and rarity, being involved in property relations, cannot but participate in pricing. If, however, we translate it into the language of classical political economy, land, owned and used for production purposes, cannot but affect the exchange ratio of goods, and therefore directly affect the exchange value. The view of the land, which is typical of some Western economists, who evaluate land rent as a payment for retaining and preserving land in this industry, goes well with this. It is obvious that here we are talking about cases when the owner himself produces on the land belonging to him, and about cases of various forms of land lease.

The alternative use of land and the cost of lost opportunities are additional arguments in favor of the fact that value of land is a full-fledged participant in the pricing of a product and land has a share in the product value. Moreover, these two points are interrelated and interdependent. Indeed, it can be assumed that if the owner of land cultivates it himself and receives a certain amount of income per hectare when growing grain on it and every year the plot is cultivated for grain, this most likely means that the alternative and more profitable occupation on this plot does not exist [ibid.].

One must not forget a crucial point in land and rental relations. Rent formation in the agrarian sector, on agricultural lands, if we are talking about its monetary form (the market recognizes only the monetary form), does not occur by itself, apart from other sectors and industries in a capitalist industrial economy, but in interaction and mutual influence and in competition with them. The formation of land rent and its distribution should be considered as the result of competition of agricultural products, farms and industry.

In agriculture, the start of production and its cessation cannot fully obey the rational principles of the market. They are entirely related to the biological conditions of the life cycle of the product produced. An agricultural producer cannot stop or suspend production, focusing on market conditions. Also, it is much more difficult for him to resume the suspended production than for an industrial producer.

In addition, market circulation and conditions of land use in the agricultural sector have peculiarities. The demand for agricultural land, as well as for other resources, is derived. According to the usual patterns of the markets of production factors, it is subordinated to the demand for products manufactured with the use of land. In addition, the demand for agricultural land depends on the endowment of resources and on their availability: we mean labour resources, basic equipment, agricultural equipment, energy carriers, fertilizers, means of combating plant diseases and their pests, as well as loan capital. At the same time, the production factors' supply in agriculture cannot be formed according to the usual principles of their market with a decentralized market economy. For an agricultural producer, they come as if from another system, where price ratios are formed according to different principles. If pricing is institutional in the agricultural sector, then, in the industrial sectors, prices are formed by the market. The production itself is subject to the principles of rationality in the industry as a whole.

These principles are crucial, because goods with prices, which are formed in the market and industrial sphere, come for exchange to the agricultural sector, where pricing is subject to other laws.

---

As a result, price ratios, that make equivalent exchange impossible, are formed. Machinery, equipment, energy carriers, fertilizers, etc. may become inaccessible to an agricultural producer at market prices, which is equivalent to a lack of supply.

Significantly, it is usually a question of providing an agricultural producer with a “target”, that is, a normal, average rate of profit in the agrarian policy of both the European Union and the USA [Log, 1991]. Land rent cannot be involved in the redistribution process. At least, the withdrawal of that part of it, which, according to A. Marshall's classification, is called the public (annual) value of land, cannot have a negative impact on production.

Secondly, if the economic organism of the society is full-fledged, then all internal relations there are interconnected and interdependent. Land rent interacts and has a powerful influence on value relations, on the exchange proportions of goods of all groups, on the movement and usage of productive resources, on education and income distribution, and on the efficiency of social production in general. At the same time, land and rental relations themselves are also strongly influenced by these factors. Land rent plays a crucial role in these interrelated and interdependent relationships. Land rent plays a key role in the relations in economic systems, where the potential of land and natural resources is high.

## Conclusion

Therefore, land and rental relations, ownership of land and its products, education, distribution, production and social use of land rent should always be under the scrutiny of the state economic policy.

## References

1. Keynes J.M. (1936) *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*. Palgrave Macmillan.
2. Kondrat'ev N.D. (1917) *Agrarnyi vopros o zemle i zemel'nykh poryadkakh* [The agrarian question of land and land orders]. Moscow.
3. Kondrat'ev N.D. (1922) *Izmeneniya mirovogo i russkogo sel'skogo khozyaistva za vremya i posle voyny i osnovnye zadachi nashei sel'skokhozyaistvennoi politiki* [Changes in world and Russian agriculture during and after the war, and the main objectives of our agricultural policy]. *Vestnik sel'skogo khozyaistva* [Bulletin of Agriculture], 6/7, pp. 5-22.
4. (2007) *Krupnyi i maliy biznes v sel'skom khozyaistve: tendentsii razvitiya, problemy, perspektivy* [Large and small business in agriculture: development trends, problems, prospects]. *Nikonovskie chteniya* [Nikon readings], 12, pp. 575-638.
5. Log J. (1991) *Collective property of workers (review of the American experience)*. USA: economics, politics, ideology, 10.
6. Marshall A. (2013) *Principles of Economics*. Palgrave Macmillan.
7. Ricardo D. (2004) *On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*. Dover Publications.
8. Samuelson P. (1997) *Economics*. McGraw-Hill Education.
9. Smith A. (2007) *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*.
10. Tskhadadze N.V. (2017) *Effektivnyi mekhanizm gosudarstvennogo regulirovaniya agrarnogo sektora* [Effective mechanism of state regulation of the agricultural sector]. In: *Predprinimatel'stvo i biznes: teoriya, metodologiya i praktika effektivnogo upravleniya*. Materialy IV Mezhdunarodnogo nauchnogo kongressa [Entrepreneurship and business: theory, methodology and practice of effective management. Proceedings of the IV International Scientific Congress]. Moscow.
11. Tskhadadze N.V. (2015) *Evolutsiya mirovoi ekonomicheskoi mysli ot istokov do nashikh dnei* [The evolution of world economic thought from the beginnings to the present day]. Moscow: Rusains Publ.
12. Tskhadadze N.V. (2016) *Sovremennye tendentsii razvitiya agrarnogo sektora v Rossii. Fenomen rynochnogo khozyaistva: ot istokov do nashikh dnei* [Modern trends in the development of the agricultural sector in Russia. The phenomenon of market economy: from the beginnings to the present day]. Krasnodar.
13. Tskhadadze N.V. (2016) *Transformatsiya instituta zemel'noi sobstvennosti v agrarnom sektore* [Transformation of the Institute of Land Ownership in the Agrarian Sector]. In: *Problemy sovremennoi ekonomiki i institutsional'naya teoriya* [Problems of the Modern Economy and Institutional Theory]. Moscow: Financial University.



---

## Природа земельной ренты

### Цхададзе Нелли Викторовна

Доктор экономических наук, профессор,  
Финансовый университет при Правительстве Российской Федерации,  
125993, Российская Федерация, Москва, просп. Ленинградский, 49;  
e-mail: nelly-vic@mail.ru

### Иоселиани Аза Давидовна

Доктор философских наук, профессор,  
Финансовый университет при Правительстве Российской Федерации,  
125993, Российская Федерация, Москва, просп. Ленинградский, 49;  
e-mail: aza-i@yandex.ru

#### Аннотация

В настоящее время назрела необходимость всестороннего и глубинного рассмотрения земельно-рентных отношений и природы земельной ренты при четком разграничении ее пределов. Сегодня доминирует понятие экономической ренты в широком смысле, и недостаточное внимание уделяет собственно земельной ренте. Выход феномена ренты за пределы сельского хозяйства и добывающей отрасли способствовал размыванию самого понятия и обезличиванию земельной ренты как экономической категории. Авторами дан всесторонний анализ земельно-рентных отношений от классиков до современности. Земельная рента оказывает мощное влияние на ценностные отношения, на товарный обмен, на распределение и использование производственных ресурсов, на образование и распределение доходов, а также на эффективность производства в целом. В то же время сами земельные и арендные отношения также находятся под сильным влиянием этих факторов.

#### Для цитирования в научных исследованиях

Цхададзе Н.В., Иоселиани А.Д. Nature of land rent // Экономика: вчера, сегодня, завтра. 2019. Том 9. № 3А. С. 536-545. DOI: 10.34670/AR.2019.89.3.059

#### Ключевые слова

Сельское хозяйство, земельная рента, продукт земли, конкуренция, собственность земли, аграрный рынок, земельно-рентные отношения, рентные платежи.

## Библиография

1. Кондратьев Н.Д. Аграрный вопрос о земле и земельных порядках. М., 1917. 64 с.
2. Кондратьев Н.Д. Изменения мирового и русского сельского хозяйства за время и после войны и основные задачи нашей сельскохозяйственной политики // Вестник сельского хозяйства. 1922. №6/7. С. 5-22.
3. Крупный и малый бизнес в сельском хозяйстве: тенденции развития, проблемы, перспективы // Никоновские чтения. 2007. №12. С. 575-638.
4. Цхададзе Н.В. Современные тенденции развития аграрного сектора в России. Феномен рыночного хозяйства: от истоков до наших дней. Краснодар, 2016. 497 с.

- 
5. Цхададзе Н.В. Трансформация института земельной собственности в аграрном секторе // Проблемы современной экономики и институциональная теория. М.: Финансовый университет, 2016. С. 150-157.
  6. Цхададзе Н.В. Эволюция мировой экономической мысли от истоков до наших дней. М.: Русайнс, 2015. 166 с.
  7. Цхададзе Н.В. Эффективный механизм государственного регулирования аграрного сектора // Предпринимательство и бизнес: теория, методология и практика эффективного управления. Материалы IV Международного научного конгресса. М., 2017. 296 с.
  8. Keynes J.M. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Palgrave Macmillan, 1936. 404 p.
  9. Log J. Collective property of workers (review of the American experience) // USA: economics, politics, ideology. 1991. № 10.
  10. Marshall A. Principles of Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 781 p.
  11. Ricardo D. On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. Dover Publications, 2004. 320 p.
  12. Samuelson P. Economics. McGraw-Hill Education, 1997. 656 p.
  13. Smith A. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 2007. 745 p.