Главная страница Контактные данные Карта проекта FAQ Форма заказа News

Статья «Проблема свободы воли и нейропсихология» / Article "The problem of free will and neuropsychology"

Наши услуги

Рецензируемые журналы

Архив

Оплата

Подписка

Методический раздел

Подбор оппонентов

Архивные данные статьи Мишура А.С. / Archival data of the article written by Mishura A.S.

Выходные данные научной статьи / Article output data

Раздел / Sectional title
[RUS]
Философия и психология нейронауки
[ENG]
Philosophy and Psychology of Neuroscience
Страницы / Pages 6-29
Тип / Type [RAR] – Научная статья
Коды / Numbers [УДК] 159.947.2
Заглавие / Title
[RUS]
Проблема свободы воли и нейропсихология
[ENG]
The problem of free will and neuropsychology
Авторы / Authors
[RUS]
Мишура
Александр Сергеевич
Научный сотрудник,
Институт рефлексивной психологии творчества и гуманизации образования
[ENG]
Mishura
Aleksandr Sergeevich
Research associate,
Institute of reflexive psychology of creativity and humane education
Аннотация / Abstract
[RUS]
В статье рассматривается связь между проблемой свободы воли в современной аналитической философии и исследованиями в области нейропсихологии и нейронауки. В первой части дается краткий обзор позиций по вопросу о свободе воле, принципов их классификации, основных проблем и задач, которые перед ними стоят. Во второй части на примере эксперимента Бенджамина Либета демонстрируется с одной стороны принципиальная ограниченность и проблематичность использования данных нейронауки и нейропсихологии в области философских дискуссий, с другой стороны их ценность для развития философских теорий свободы воли.
[ENG]
Neuroscience experiments relating to the problems of free will at modern stage, first, provide information only on a very specific range of actions available to a human being. Second, need even for this level a serious change in their design to eliminate or operationalize those assumptions, which are now accepted without necessary amendments in the interpretation of these experiments. Third, the data obtained by scientists does not contradict the experience of free will, as well as does not contradict theoretical foundations of the presence of such. Lot of things really understood by us "post factum", that, however, does not make our actions not free, the mind is not equal to the space of freedom.
If modern philosophy revolves around the issue of the subject, then the philosophical path, from the author's point of view, rests upon the essence of the subject, upon that, what sets it apart from everything else in the world.
An important evidence of such a fundamental nature of the question of free will is the fact that it is necessary to develop many areas of both philosophical and scientific knowledge for its decision. Neuroscience, like other sciences can give philosophers invaluable material that let, at least, understand how far the scope of the physiological laws and determinism is spanned at all.
Текст / Text
[RUS]
Введение Развитие науки меняет наши представления о свободе...
Ключевые слова / Keywords
[RUS]
Аналитическая философия
философия сознания
свобода воли
психология
нейропсихология
нейронаука
Либет
метафизика
воля
антропология
[ENG]
Analytic philosophy
philosophy of mind
free will
psychology
neuropsychology
neuroscience
Libet
metaphysics
will
anthropology
Ссылки / References
[RUS]
  1. Семенов И.Н., Степанов С.Ю. Типы взаимодействия наук и методологические ориентации в психологии творчества и рефлексии // Наука о человеке. – М.: ИП АН СССР, 1990.
  2. Шелер М. Положение человека в Космосе / Пер. А. Филиппова // Проблема человека в западной философии: Переводы / Сост. и послесл. П. С. Гуревича; общ. ред. Ю. Н. Попова. — М.: Прогресс, 1988. – C. 31-95.
  3. Bandura A. Reconstrual of “free will” from the agentic perspective of social cognitive theory // J. Baer, J. C. Kaufman, R. F. Baumeister. Are we free?: Psychology and free will. – Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008. – Pp. 86-127.
  4. Bargh J.A. Free will is un-natural // J. Baer, J. C. Kaufman R. F. Baumeister. Are we free? Psychology and free will. – Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008. – Pp. 128-154.
  5. Bargh J.A., Ferguson, M.L. Beyond behaviorism: On the automaticity of higher mental processes // Psychological Bulletin. – 2000. – No. 126. – Pp. 92-945.
  6. Blackmore S. The meme machine. – Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999. – 288 p.
  7. Brass M., Haggard P. To do or not to do: The neural signature of self-control // Journal of Neuroscience. – 2007. – No. 27. – Pp. 9141-9145.
  8. Chalmers D. Facing up to the problem of consciousness // Journal of Consciousness Studies. – 1995. – No. 2(3). – Pp. 200-219.
  9. Chisholm R.M. Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study. – La Salle: Open Court, 1976. – 232 p.
  10. Chisholm R.M. The Agent as Cause // In Action Theory / ed. Myles Brand and Douglas Walton. – Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1976. – Pp. 199-211.
  11. Churchland P.M. The engine of reason, the seat of the soul: A philosophical journey into the brain. – Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995. – 324 p.
  12. Clarke R. Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action // Philosophical Topics. – 1996. – No. 2(24). – Pp. 19-48.
  13. Clarke R. Free Choice, Effort, and Wanting More // Philosophical Explorations. – 1999. – No. 2. – Pp. 20-41.
  14. Clarke R. Libertarian Views: Critical Survey of Noncausal and Event-Causal Accounts of Free Agency // The Oxford Handbook of Free Will / ed. Robert Kane. – New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. – Pp. 356-385.
  15. Clarke R. Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will // Nous. – 1993. – No. 27. – Pp. 191-203.
  16. Crick F. The astonishing hypothesis: The scientific search for the soul. – New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. – 336 p.
  17. Dennett D. Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Having. – Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. – 200 p.
  18. Desmurget M., Reilly K.T., Richard N., Szathmari A., Mottolese C., Sirigu A. Movement intention after parietal cortex stimulation in humans // Science. – 2009. – No. 324(5928). – Pp. 811-813.
  19. Fischer J.M. The metaphysics of free will: an essay on control. – Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994. – 284 p.
  20. Frankfurt H. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person // Journal of Philosophy. – 1971. – No. 68. – Pp. 5-20.
  21. Ginet C. Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency // Journal of Ethics. – 1997. – No. 1. – Pp. 85-98.
  22. Ginet C. On Action. – Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. – 159 p.
  23. Ginet C. Reasons Explanations of Action: An Incompatibilist Account // Philosophical Perspectives. –1989. – No. 3. – Pp. 17-46.
  24. Ginet C. Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist versus Noncausalist Accounts // The Oxford Handbook of Free Will / ed. Robert Kane. – New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. – Pp. 386-405.
  25. Greene J., Cohen J. For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything // Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B. Biological Sciences. – 2004. – No. 359(1451). – Pp. 1775-1785.
  26. Honderich T. Essays on Freedom of Action. – London: Routledge, 1973. – 215 p.
  27. Honderich T. How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem. 2nd ed. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. – 184 p.
  28. Kane R. A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will. – New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. – 208 p.
  29. Kane R. Free Will and Values. – Albany: SUNY Press, 1985. – 229 p.
  30. Kane R. Free Will. – Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2001. – 328 p.
  31. Kane R. Responsibility, Luck, and Chance // Journal of Philosophy. – 1999. – No. 5(96). – P. 225.
  32. Kane R. The Significance of Free Will. – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. – 280 p.
  33. Lau H.C., Rogers R.D., Passingham R.E. On measuring the perceived onsets of spontaneous actions // Journal of Neuroscience. – 2006. – No. 26. – Pp. 7265-7271.
  34. Libet B. Consciousness, free action and the brain // Journal of Consciousness Studies. – 2001. – No. 8. – Pp. 59-65.
  35. Libet B. Mind time: The temporal factor in consciousness. – Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004. – 248 p.
  36. Libet B. Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action // Behavioral Brain Sciences. – 1985. – No. 8. – Pp. 529-566.
  37. O’Connor T. Agent Causation // In Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will / ed. Timothy O’Connor. – New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. – Pp. 173-200.
  38. O’Connor T. Causality, Mind, and Free Will // Philosophical Perspectives. – 2000. – No. 14. – Pp. 105-117.
  39. O’Connor T. Why Agent Causation? // Philosophical Topics. –1996. – No. 24(2). – Pp. 143-158.
  40. Pereboom D. Determinism al Dente // Nous. –1995. – No. 29. – Pp. 21-45.
  41. Searle J. Minds, Brains and Science. – Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986. – 107 p.
  42. Searle J.R. Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power. – New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. – 128 p.
  43. Searle J.R. The Mystery of Consciousness. 1st ed. – New York: New York Review Books, 1990. – 224 p.
  44. Smart J.J.C. Free-Will, Praise and Blame // Mind. – 1961. – No. 70. – Pp. 291-306.
  45. Smart J.J.C., Haldane J. Atheism and Theism. – Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003. – 270 p.
  46. Smilansky S. Free will and illusion. – New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. – 344 p.
  47. Strawson G. Freedom and Belief. – Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. – 339 p.
  48. Trevena J., Miller J. Brain preparation before a voluntary action: Evidence against unconscious movement initiation // Consciousness and Cognition. – 2010. – No. 19. – Pp. 447-456.
  49. van Inwagen P. An Essay on Free Will. – Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1983. – 248 p.
  50. Vohs K.D., Schooler J.W. The Value of Believing in Free Will: Encouraging a Belief in Determinism Increases Cheating // Psychological Science. – 2008. – No. 19(1). – Pp. 49-54.
  51. Warrington E., Weiskrantz L. A study of learning and retention in amnesic patients // Neuropsychologia. – 1968. –No. 6. – Pp. 283-291.
  52. Watson G. Free agency // Journal of Philosophy. – 1975. – No. 72. – Pp. 205-220.
  53. Wegner D.M. The illusion of conscious will. – Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 2002. – 419 p.
  54. Wolf S. Asymmetrical Freedom // Journal of Philosophy. – 1980. – No. 77. – Pp. 157-166.
[ENG]
  1. Bandura, A. (2008), "Reconstrual of "free will" from the agentic perspective of social cognitive theory", J. Baer, J. C. Kaufman, R. F. Baumeister. Are we free? Psychology and free will, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 86-127.
  2. Bargh, J.A. (2008), "Free will is un-natural", J. Baer, J. C. Kaufman R. F. Baumeister. Are we free? Psychology and free will, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, pp. 128-154.
  3. Bargh, J.A., Ferguson, M.L. (2000), "Beyond behaviorism: On the automaticity of higher mental processes", Psychological Bulletin, No. 126, pp. 92-945.
  4. Blackmore, S. (1999), The meme machine, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 288 p.
  5. Brass, M., Haggard, P. (2007), "To do or not to do: The neural signature of self-control", Journal of Neuroscience, No. 27, pp. 9141-9145.
  6. Semenov, I.N., Stepanov, S.Yu. (1990), "Types of science interfaces and methodological orientations in psychology of creativity and reflection", Science about a human being ["Tipy vzaimodeistviya nauk i metodologicheskie orientatsii v psikhologii tvorchestva i refleksii", Nauka o cheloveke], IP AN SSSR, Moscow.
  7. Chalmers, D. (1995), "Facing up to the problem of consciousness", Journal of Consciousness Studies, No. 2(3), pp. 200-219.
  8. Chisholm, R.M. (1976), "The Agent as Cause", Action Theory, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 199-211.
  9. Chisholm, R.M. (1976), Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study, Open Court, La Salle, 232 p.
  10. Churchland, P.M. (1995), The engine of reason, the seat of the soul: A philosophical journey into the brain, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 324 p.
  11. Clarke, R. (1993), "Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free Will", Nous, No. 27, pp. 191-203.
  12. Clarke, R. (1996), "Agent Causation and Event Causation in the Production of Free Action", Philosophical Topics, No. 2(24), pp. 19-48.
  13. Clarke, R. (1999), "Free Choice, Effort, and Wanting More", Philosophical Explorations, No. 2, pp. 20-41.
  14. Clarke, R. (2002), "Libertarian Views: Critical Survey of Noncausal and Event-Causal Accounts of Free Agency", The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 356-385.
  15. Crick, F. (1994), The astonishing hypothesis: The scientific search for the soul, Simon & Schuster, New York, 336 p.
  16. Dennett, D. (2004), Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Having, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 200 p.
  17. Desmurget, M., Reilly, K.T., Richard, N., Szathmari, A., Mottolese, C., Sirigu, A. (2009), "Movement intention after parietal cortex stimulation in humans", Science, No. 324(5928), pp. 811-813.
  18. Fischer, J.M. (1994), The metaphysics of free will: an essay on control, Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass., 284 p.
  19. Frankfurt, H. (1971), "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person", Journal of Philosophy, No. 68, pp. 5-20.
  20. Ginet, C. (1989), "Reasons Explanations of Action: An Incompatibilist Account", Philosophical Perspectives, No. 3, pp. 17-46.
  21. Ginet, C. (1990), On Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 159 p.
  22. Ginet, C. (1997), "Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency", Journal of Ethics, No. 1, pp. 85-98.
  23. Ginet, C. (2002), "Reasons Explanations of Action: Causalist versus Noncausalist Accounts", The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 386-405.
  24. Greene, J., Cohen, J. (2004), "For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything", Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B. Biological Sciences, No. 359(1451), pp. 1775-1785.
  25. Honderich, T. (1973), Essays on Freedom of Action, Routledge, London, 215 p.
  26. Honderich, T. (2002), How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem. 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 184 p.
  27. Kane, R. (1985), Free Will and Values, SUNY Press, Albany, 229 p.
  28. Kane, R. (1996), The Significance of Free Will, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 280 p.
  29. Kane, R. (1999), "Responsibility, Luck, and Chance", Journal of Philosophy, No. 5(96), p. 225.
  30. Kane, R. (2001), Free Will, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 328 p.
  31. Kane, R. (2005), A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will, Oxford University Press, New York, 208 p.
  32. Lau, H.C., Rogers, R.D., Passingham, R.E. (2006), "On measuring the perceived onsets of spontaneous actions", Journal of Neuroscience, No. 26, pp. 7265-7271.
  33. Libet, B. (1985), "Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action", Behavioral Brain Sciences, No. 8, Pp. 529-566.
  34. Libet, B. (2001), "Consciousness, free action and the brain", Journal of Consciousness Studies, No. 8, pp. 59-65.
  35. Libet, B. (2004), Mind time: The temporal factor in consciousness, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 248 p.
  36. O'Connor, T. (1995), "Agent Causation", Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 173-200.
  37. O'Connor, T. (1996), "Why Agent Causation?", Philosophical Topics, No. 24(2), pp. 143-158.
  38. O'Connor, T. (2000), "Causality, Mind, and Free Will", Philosophical Perspectives, No. 14, pp. 105-117.
  39. Pereboom, D. (1995), "Determinism al Dente", Nous, No. 29, pp. 21-45.
  40. Searle, J. (1986), Minds, Brains and Science, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 107 p.
  41. Searle, J.R. (1990), The Mystery of Consciousness. 1st ed., New York Review Books, New York, 224 p.
  42. Searle, J.R. (2007), Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power, Columbia University Press, New York, 128 p.
  43. Sheler, M., Popov, Yu. N. (1988), "Man's position in space", The problem of a man in Western philosophy: Translations ["Polozhenie cheloveka v Kosmose", Problema cheloveka v zapadnoi filosofii: Perevody], Progress, Moscow, pp. 31-95.
  44. Smart, J.J.C. (1961), "Free-Will, Praise and Blame", Mind, No. 70, pp. 291-306.
  45. Smart, J.J.C., Haldane, J. (2003), Atheism and Theism, Wiley-Blackwell, Malden, MA, 270 p.
  46. Smilansky, S. (2000), Free will and illusion, Oxford University Press, New York, 344 p.
  47. Strawson, G. (1986), Freedom and Belief, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 339 p.
  48. Trevena, J., Miller, J. (2010), "Brain preparation before a voluntary action: Evidence against unconscious movement initiation", Consciousness and Cognition, No. 19, pp. 447-456.
  49. van Inwagen, P. (1983), An Essay on Free Will, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 248 p.
  50. Vohs, K.D., Schooler, J.W. (2008), "The Value of Believing in Free Will: Encouraging a Belief in Determinism Increases Cheating", Psychological Science, No. 19(1), pp. 49-54.
  51. Warrington, E., Weiskrantz, L. (1968), "A study of learning and retention in amnesic patients", Neuropsychologia, No. 6, pp. 283-291.
  52. Watson, G. (1975), "Free agency", Journal of Philosophy, No. 72, pp. 205-220.
  53. Wegner, D.M. (2002), The illusion of conscious will, MIT Press Cambridge, MA, 419 p.
  54. Wolf, S. (1980), "Asymmetrical Freedom", Journal of Philosophy, No. 77, pp. 157-166.
Файлы / Files 1-mishura.pdf

Выходные данные журнала «Психология. Историко-критические обзоры и современные исследования», в котором размещена статья / Publisher's imprint of the journal "Psychology. Historical-critical Reviews and Current Researches", which includes the article ►